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In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview[edit]. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.

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Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Blackwell, second revised edition second edition, ; first edition, BartlettJ. Oxford University Press, third edition second edition, ; the first edition of is listed separately as Martinich [] McGuinnessB.

Sources were checked, errors were eliminated, and page numbers were gegfnstand whenever possible. Making use of his definition of the ancestral transitive closure of a binary relation as developed in Begriffsschrifthe defines the finite or natural numbers as those objects standing to 0 in the transitive reflexive closure of the successor relation, that is, informally, as those numbers than can be reached from 0 by taking successors finitely many times.

Unary functions mapping objects to objects are first level, unary functions mapping first-level functions to objects are second level an instance being the concept denoted by the first-level existential quantifier, which maps every first-level concept under which some object falls to the True, and all other first-level concepts to the Falseand so on.


Gottlob Frege > Chronological Catalog of Frege’s Work (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

From Frege to Wittgenstein: Nach der Mitschrift von Rudolf Carnap. In the latter statement, Frege claims, the is must denote identity and cannot function merely as a copula, since four is a singular term, ggegenstand singular terms cannot follow the is of predication.

Second Series,” in CPpp.

The crucial case of the law may be gegehstand in modern notation as follows. Wright, Basic Laws of Arithmetic: While the second volume of Grundgesetze was in press, he hastily devised a quick fix that has freg to be known as Frege’s way out and added an appendix to the book, expressing both confidence that the revised system would prove capable of reconstructing arithmetic and worries about the philosophical underpinning of his revised basic law V.

Reprinted in Conceptual Notation and Related Articlestr.

Über Begriff und Gegenstand

Oxford University Press, Dudman in Dudman [] and in McGuinness [] pp. The use of extensions allows for the technique of type-lowering: Beaney, Michael, and Erich H.

While he followed Immanuel Kant in taking the truths of Euclidean geometry to be synthetic and knowable a priori forcefully defending this view against Hilbert’s axiomatic method in geometryhe vigorously argued, against Kant, for the logicist thesis, that is, the claim that the arithmetic truths, presumably including real and complex analysis, are analytic.

University of Chicago Press, Psychologische und logische Untersuchung. Frege matriculated at the University of Jena in the spring of as a citizen of the North German Confederation. Olms, ; reprinted in Thiel begrivf The Foundations of Arithmetic: Gottlob Frege at Wikipedia’s sister projects.


Concept and object

Kant and Frege on Existence. Presumably he had planned a third volume, which, however, never appeared. Licensing for more information. Thus on the one hand, numbers, qua properties of concepts, would frrege to be higher-order concepts; yet on the other hand, they must be construed as objects. Hale, Bob, and Crispin Wright.

Gottlob Frege, Über Begriff und Gegenstand – PhilPapers

Debate continues begruff to Frege’s intentions concerning indirect senses of expressions, in particular whether iterated propositional attitude contexts give rise to an infinite hierarchy of indirect senses. But there can be little doubt that he already envisages a definite path along which the ultimate proof of logicism is to proceed. By the time of Grundlagen the doctrine of logicism is firmly in place.

Blackwell GeachP. Bad KleinenMecklenburg-SchwerinGermany.

The Reason’s Proper Study: Reicher – – Grazer Philosophische Studien Georg Olms,tr. Permission Reusing this file. Public domain Public domain false false. His book the Foundations of Arithmetic is the seminal text of the gegensttand project, and is cited by Michael Dummett as where to pinpoint the linguistic turn.

It has been translated by E. Selected Readings2nd edition, eds. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, The footnotes containing Frege’s remarks are collated and reprinted in Angelelli [] pp.